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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1#

Did the Public Service Commission abuse its

discretion in interpreting a tariff to permit Mountain Bell
to transfer a partnership debt for past telephone service to
the current business service account of a general partner?
2.

Did Mountain Bell violate any constitutional,

statutory or common law rights of McCune by transferring the
partnership debt to his individual proprietor account?
DETERMINATIVE REGULATIONS
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
Exchange and Network Services Tariff, Section A2.2.3.2(3).
A.

As constituted from December 30, 1982 to March 4,

1985:
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for
services under one or more numbers at the same location,
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such
indebtedness for a residence account against the same
customer's residence service or a business account
against the customer's business service.
B.

As constituted from March 4, 1985 to present:

In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for
charges and services rendered at a prior time, of any
nature, or for service at more than one number or location, and the customer does not pay the charges or
satisfy such indebtedness, the Company may charge and
bill such indebtedness against the account of the customer's present service or to the account of either service in the case where more than one number or location
is being served.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants filed a complaint in the Public Service
Commission seeking an injunction prohibiting Mountain Bell
from disconnecting George McCune1s sole proprietor account
for business telephone service, or any other accounts of the
individual appellants, for non payment of a bill for telephone service rendered to a dissolved partnership, McCune &
McCune, of which George McCune was a general partner (R. 112).

Appellants also sought a declaration that Mountain

Bell's actions in transferring the partnership account to
the service accounts of the individual partners was unconstitutional and unlawful, and requested the Commission to
invalidate and replace regulations permitting such action.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law
Judge issued a Report and Order dismissing the Complaint
with prejudice, holding that the complaints of all appellants except George McCune were moot, and that George
McCune's complaint was without merit (R. 197-204).

The Com-

mission approved the Report and Order, whereupon Appellants
filed a Petition for Review or Rehearing (R. 208-227), which
was denied (R. 228-229).

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Commission's Findings of Fact, as set forth in its
Report and Order (attached hereto in the Addendum), may be
summarized as follows:

Mountain Bell provided service to McCune & McCune, a law
partnership, until sometime in 1983 (R. 2, 90). The
partnership was dissolved and the service was disconnected,
leaving an undisputed balance of $317.29 (R. 91).

In June,

1984, with the account still unpaid, Mountain Bell rebilled
the balance to the residence service account of James
McCune, one of the general partners (R. 198). When he
failed to pay the account in full, following a normal billing cycle, Mountain Bell disconnected his residence service
(R. 198). After receiving and investigating a complaint
about the disconnection, Mountain Bell discovered that its
then existing tariff, which had recently been filed as part
of a comprehensive reorganization of the general exchange
tariff (R. 181-83), did not explicitly permit cross-billing
from a business to a residence account, and therefore restored James McCune's residence service (R. 198).
Because the tariff did permit cross-billing between
business accounts, Mountain Bell then transferred the
partnership bill to an account for business service for
George McCune, the other general partner (R. 198-99).
Facing the prospect of disconnection of his individual business service, George McCune filed a lawsuit in district
court to enjoin the disconnection, and to recover damages

(R. 250).

Upon stipulation, that action was stayed to per-

mit him to file a complaint in the Public Service Commission , to determine the validity and applicability of the
tariff provision under which Mountain Bell was proceeding.
At all times material to the above described incidents,
Mountain Bell's General Exchange Tariff, on file with the
Commission, contained provisions relating to the transfer of
an outstanding indebtedness to another account of a customer
(R. 200)

Those provisions and their effective dates are set

forth below:
A.

Prior to December 30, 1982:

In the event a customer is indebted to the Telephone
Company for charges and services rendered at a prior
time, of any nature, or for service at more than one
number or location, and the customer does not pay the
charges or satisfy such indebtedness, the Telephone Company may charge and bill such indebtedness against the
account of the customer's present service or to the account of either service in the case where more than one
number or location is being served.
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General
Exchange Tariff Section 20(L)(4)).
B.

December 30, 1982:

In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for
services under one or more numbers at the same location,
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such
indebtedness for a residence account against the same
customer's residence service or a business account
against the customer's business service.
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah Exchange and
Network Services Tariff A2.2.3.2(3)).

This tariff provision was part of a comprehensive revision of basic exchange tariffs occuring in all seven states
in which Mountain Bell does business (designated the n ABC w
tariff).

The change was the result of an effort to simplify

the numbering of the tariffs, among other things.

It was

not intended to change the wording of this provision.

The

provision was inadvertently changed from the previous tariff
provision, and the change did not come to Mountain Bell's
attention until Appellants complained about the disconnection of James McCune's residence service (R. 112). That
disconnection occurred under the assumption that the previous provision had not been changed in the process of
filing the ABC tariff (R. 112). As a result. Mountain Bell
restored James McCune's residence service (R. 198) and then
took action to reinstate the original provision, which was
accomplished effective March 4, 1985, as follows:
C.

March 4, 1985:

In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for
charges and services rendered at a prior time, of any
nature, or for service at more than one number or location, and the customer does not pay the charges or
satisfy such indebtedness, the Company may charge and
bill such indebtedness against the account of the customer's present service or to the account of either service in the case where more than one number or location
is being served.
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company - Utah Exchange and Network Services Tariff Section A2.2.3.2(3)).
McCune's Complaint in the Public Service Commission was
filed on March 7, 1985 (R. 258).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The tariff in question provided that when a customer is
indebted to Mountain Bell for prior servicef Mountain Bell
may transfer the debt to the customer's account for present
service.

As a general partner, George McCune is jointly

liable and hence indebted to Mountain Bell for the partnership's debt.

Thusf the tariff permits the partnership's

debt to be transferred to McCune*s individual account for
business service.
The Public Service Commission's interpretation of the
tariff to allow cross-billing of a dissolved partnership's
debt to the account of one of the partners was within its
authority, was reasonable, and was appropriate under the
facts of this case.

This Court should accord considerable

deference to the Commission's decision on this question involving the application of law (the tariff) to specific
facts.

The Commission did not act with bias, prejudice or

passion.
The transfer of the partnership's debt to McCune's individual account did not violate his constitutional rights.
Due process does not apply because no state action was involved.

With respect to equal protection, there is no

evidence that he was treated differently from others similarly situated.

McCune's statutory rights were not violated

because the tariff in question, as interpreted by the Public
Service Commission, is just and reasonable, both on its face
and as applied.

McCune's common law rights were not vio-

lated, because Mountain Bell followed the tariff procedure.
Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), is
distinguishable on its facts, and in any event should be
overruled.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN INTERPRETING THE TARIFF TO PERMIT MOUNTAIN BELL
TO TRANSFER A PARTNERSHIP DEBT FOR TELEPHONE SERVICE TO
THE BUSINESS ACCOUNT OF A GENERAL PARTNER.
The central issue of this case is whether Mountain Bell

was entitled to transfer a delinquent account for telephone
service rendered to a partnership, since dissolved, to a
current account for business service being rendered to one
of the partners, under the following tariff provision:
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for
services under one or more numbers at the same location,
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such
indebtedness for a residence account against the same
customer's residence service or a business account
against the customer's business service.
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General
Exchange Tariff A2.2.3.2(3)).
The Public Service Commission determined that Mountain
Bell's action was authorized by the tariff and was
reasonable under the circumstances (R. 197-203).

The order

dismissing McCune's complaint necessarily implied the Public
Service Commission's conclusion that the tariff is just and
reasonable, both on its face and as applied (R. 203).
A.
The Public Service Commission has the power to
interpret a tariff.
The Public Service Commission has broad power to
regulate the utility business of public utilities.

Utah

Code Ann. § 54-4-1 provides:
General jurisdiction. The commission is hereby vested
with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all
of the business of every such public utility in this
state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary
or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction . . . .
See White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 700 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Utah 1985).
Such power includes the power to approve, suspend or
modify the schedules and regulations filed by a utility.
E.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-7, 54-3-8, 54-3-23, 54-4-2, 544-7, 54-7-13. This extensive regulatory authority necessarily implies the Commission's power to interpret or construe a utility's regulations with respect to the facts of a
particular case, and to determine the rights and obligations
between utilities and consumers.

See Mountain Bell v.

Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)]? North Salt
Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation, Co., 118 Utah 600,
223 P.2d 577 (1950).

Thus, the Public Service Commission

was well within its jurisdiction to interpret the tariff at
issue in this case.
B.

The standard of review of a Public Service Commission order interpreting a tariff is to uphold the
order if it is reasonable or rational.

In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) [Wexpro II],
this Court established a three part formula for review of
administrative agency decisions:
1.

With regard to interpretation of general questions

of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard,
giving no deference to the expertise of the Commission.

Id.

at 608.
2.

With regard to findings of basic fact, the Court

gives the greatest deference to the agency's findings, reversing only where they are so without foundation in fact
that they must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.

I<i.

at

608-09.
3.

With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, or

the application of findings of basic facts to the legal
rules governing the case, or the "ultimate" findings of the
agency on reasonableness and discrimination, or the agency's
decision on questions of "special law", this Court gives
"considerable weight" or "great deference" to the agency's
decision, upholding such decisions if they fall within the
limits of reasonableness or rationality.

Id. at 609-12.

See Utah Code Ann, § 54-7-16.

See also, Big K Corp. v.

Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984).
This third standard of review applies here because this
case involves the application of a tariff, which is the law
governing the relation between a utility and its customers,
see Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain Bell, 709 P.2d 330
(Utah 1985), to specific facts.

The Commission determined

that under the tariff Mountain Bell may transfer a partnership debt for telephone service to the individual account of
one of the general partners.

Under the intermediate stan-

dard of review applicable here, this Court should give great
deference to that decision, and should affirm it if it falls
within the "outer limits of reasonableness".

See Wexpro II,

supra, at 611.
C.
The Public Service Commission's order is reasonable
and should therefore be upheld.
The Public Service Commission's determination that the
tariff permitted cross-billing of a partnership account to
the individual account of a general partner is reasonable,
both from a legal perspective and on a practical basis.
Utah statutory law provides unequivocally that a general
partner is personally liable for the debts of the
partnership:

All partners are liable:
•

• •

(2)

Jointly for all other [non-tort/non-breach of
trust] debts and obligations of the partnership . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12.
That a partner's liability for contractual debts is
joint, rather than joint and several (as in subparagraph 1
of the same section), is simply a procedural restriction on
a creditor who seeks to enforce a debt through judicial
means.

That is, all partners are necessary parties to a

lawsuit to enforce such a debt against any one of them.

See

Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 28788 (1932); cf. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984) (all
partners are necessary parties to an action to collect a
debt to the partnership).

The fact remains, however, that

each partner is personally indebted for partnership obligations.

See definition of "liability" in Black's Law Dictio-

nary 1059 (4th Rev.Ed. 1968).

Therefore, notwithstanding

the fact that Mountain Bell would have to join James McCune
in any judicial action to recover the debt from George
McCune, George McCune is still indebted to Mountain Bell for
$317.29, representing the McCune & McCune debt for telephone
service.
Under the tariff language (see supra p.7), the only
prerequisites to cross-billing are (1) that George McCune

was a customer of Mountain Bell and (2) that he was indebted
to Mountain Bell for charges and services previously rendered in Utah.

At the time of the transfer, he was clearly

a customer of Mountain Bell, with current working business
servicef and he was indebted to Mountain Bell for charges
and services previously rendered.

Note that the tariff lan-

guage does not say "charges and services rendered to that
customer under his or her own name w , or similar language.
It simply requires a customer to be indebted to Mountain
Bell for prior charges and services.
The tariff does not require Mountain Bell to obtain a
judicial declaration of indebtedness, as by obtaining a
judgment against a partner on a partnership account.
McCune's insistence that Mountain Bell must first obtain a
judgment against the partnership and exhaust its assets before proceeding against a partner is misplaced.

This is not

a case of judicial collection of a debt nor of an extrajudicial attempt to execute on McCune's personal assets; it
is a case of application of an administrative rule permitting a public utility to deny continuing service to a customer who fails to satisfy a past due obligation.
The Commission's interpretation of the tariff also makes
practical sense.
responsible party.

Cross-billing encourages payment by a
Payment of such indebtedness contributes

to the utility's earnings, thus reducing the need for rate

increases.

Cross-billing places the burden for such debts

where it belongs, rather than on other ratepayers.

From a

cost-effectiveness standpoint, to the extent cross-billing
results in payment, it is a much more efficient means of
collection than any other alternative, such as collection
agencies, attorneys, or even internal collection efforts.
The policy which denies service to a customer who fails to
pay past indebtedness is eminently fair; it does not impose
any new obligation on the customer, nor does it permit
Mountain Bell to recover more than what is owed.

It simply

benefits the public by reducing collection costs, and cuts
off credit to those who abuse credit by not paying for prior
service.
As applied to this case, not only is the tariff just and
reasonable, but Mountain Bell would be derelict not to use
it.

The partnership was dissolved more than a year before

the transfer took place (R. 197, 198). The account is undisputed and relatively small (R. 91). McCune has refused
to give any explanation why the partnership account has not
been paid, or whether it will ever be paid, or if so, when
(R. 88). Mountain Bell stands the risk of losing the account altogether by virtue of the running of the statute of
limitations.

The cost of recovering it through judicial

means makes that alternative unattractive and detrimental to

other ratepayers.

Under these circumstances, it is rea-

sonable to expect a partner such as George McCune to
shoulder the responsibility for paying the partnership debtf
at the risk of not having further telephone service if he
fails to do so.
Under the standard of review applicable to this case,
this Court should affirm the Public Service Commission Order , because it falls well within the bounds of
reasonableness.
D.
The Public Service Commission did not act with
bias, prejudice or passion?
McCune's allegations of improper treatment received at
the hands of the Public Service Commission cannot be supported by the record.

McCune1s Brief refers to testimony

given at the hearing. (Brief of Appellant p. 11).

However,

McCune opted not to order a copy of the transcript of the
hearing, and is therefore forced to rely on the Report and
Order.
In the absence of a transcript, this Court must assume
that the proceedings were conducted fairly.

Bevan v. J. H.

Construction Co., Inc.f 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983).

There can

be no doubt that McCune was given ample oppurtunity to present his case.

That he received an adverse ruling is not

grounds for a claim of prejudice sufficient to reverse the
Commission's Order.

Reversal for bias must be based on

evidence of a judge's personal hostility toward a party, not
on the tribunal's opinion as to the merits of the case, Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948); there is
no evidence in the record that any feelings expressed by the
Administrative Law Judge or the Commission were based on
anything other than the evidence and material facts of this
case.
E.

The Public Service Commission properly determined
that issues regarding the disconnection of James
McCune's residence service were moot.

McCune complains that the Commission failed to address
the disconnection of the residence service of James McCune,
holding it to be a moot question.

To do so, however, would

require the Commission to render an advisory opinion where
it does not have power to grant appropriate relief (money
damages in this case).

Furthermore, McCune would have an

available remedy on that claim in the district court, which
is the appropriate forum to pursue a tort action for wrongful disconnection.

See Atkin, Wright & Miles v. The

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 709 P.2d
330 (Utah 1985); Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850
(Utah 1978).
The Public Service Commission does not have the power to
award general damages, cf. Garkane Power Association v.
Public Service Commission, 681 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984)
(an order for reparation under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 is

not the equivalent of a contract action for damages in a
district court); the only relief it could grant for a wrongful disconnection would be to order the utility to restore
service and waive the restoral charges.
Ann. §§ 54-7-20, 54-7-24.

See, e.g. Utah Code

That had already taken place be-

fore the Complaint was filed.

Thus, the Public Service

Commission correctly determined that the complaint was moot
as to James and Arlene McCune.
II. MOUNTAIN BELL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL,
STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF MCCUNE BY TRANSFERRING
THE PARTNERSHIP DEBT TO HIS PROPRIETORSHIP ACCOUNT.
A.

There was no violation of constitutional rights.

McCunes assert that they have been denied due process
because of the disconnection or threat of disconnection of
telephone service without notice and a hearing.

There is a

substantial question whether one would be deprived of life,
liberty or property by virtue of disconnection of telephone
service.

See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.

345, 348 n.2 (1974).

More importantly, however, McCunes are

not entitled to constitutional due process in this situation
because a public utility's actions in disconnecting service
do not constitute state action.

In Jackson v. Metropolitan

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974), the United States
Supreme Court stated:
"The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that
of the State for purposes of the 14th Amendment."

The effect of the decision was to uphold the right of the
defendant, a public utility, to disconnect service to the
plaintiff for failure to pay a prior bill, without notice or
hearing,

Jackson is dispositive of McCune's constitutional

challenges in this case.

Furthermore, McCune's equal pro-

tection argument fails for lack of any evidence that
Mountain Bell treated him differently than others similarly
situated.

See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah

1984).
B.

There was no violation of statutory law.

The statutory standard for validity of tariff provisions
is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1:
... All rules and regulations made by a public utility
affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the
public shall be just and reasonable. (Emphasis added).
That section further provides:
The scope of the definition "just and reasonable" may
include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of customer, economic
impact of charges on each category of customer, and on
the well-being of the State of Utah. . . .
The tariff permitting the transfer of indebtedness to
current accounts is just and reasonable, both on its face
and as applied to the facts of this case.

See discussion,

supra, pp. 10-15.
C.

There was no violation of common law.

Cross-billing and disconnection have been upheld judicially where authorized by tariff.

In Morse v. Pacific Gas

& Electric, 152 Cal.App.2d 854, 314 P.2d 192 (1957), the
Court approved the disconnection of electrical service to a
subscriber at one residence when he had failed to pay for
service at another residence, under a tariff provision similar to the one at issue here.

See also, Dworman v. Consoli-

dated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 271 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966)
(allowing cross-billing from business to residence); Denham
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 415 F.Supp. 530, 534
(W.D. Okla. 1976).

Cf., Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 9 Ohio St. 2d 153, 224 N.E.2d
528 (1967) (denying the utility's right to disconnect at
locations other than where the default took place because
the applicable tariff did not allow cross-billing).
Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978),
does not preclude Mountain Bell from cross-billing from one
business to another business.

In Josephson, the Court held

that Mountain Bell was not entitled to disconnect the
plaintiff's residence service for failure to pay the charges
for plaintiff's business service, because, inter alia,
Mountain Bell had failed to follow the procedure set forth
in the tariff of billing the charges to the residence service account before disconnecting. j[d. at 852.

Though pres-

ented with the opportunity, this Court did not hold the
tariff to be unjust or unreasonable.

Furthermore, even if

Josephson were read to mean that Mountain Bell could never

disconnect a residence phone for non-payment of business
service, the rationale used by the Court would not apply to
this case, since the partnership service and George McCune's
proprietorship service were both of a business class. The
Commission reached the same conclusion (R. 277).
If Josephson were held applicable here, Mountain Bell
submits that it was wronqly decided and should be overruled.
It has been held that a public utility has a right to deny
service at one address for failure to pay for past service
at another address, where the right is founded on a filed
tariff.

See generally, Annot. 73 A.L.R.3d 1292 §§ 4[c],

4[e] (1976).

Justice Hall's dissent in Josephson noted that

it would be inefficient and detrimental to other rate payers
to prohibit crossbilling for the purpose of debt collection,
observing that no one should be entitled to profit from his
own wrongdoing.

The dissent in Josephson is better reasoned

than the majority opinion, and should be adopted by this
Court as the law of Utah.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mountain Bell's tariff specifically permits the rebilling of a customer's indebtedness for prior charges and services to the customer's current service.

George McCune, as

a general partner of McCune & McCune, is personally indebted
to Mountain Bell for service to the partnership.

The tariff

is reasonable, just, and in the public interest.

McCune

ought to be required to pay the indebtedness if he wishes to
receive further service.

The Commission's interpretation of

the tariff is reasonable and proper, and should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of Julyf 1986,
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Floyd^A. Jensen
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 237-6409.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of July, 1986f I
caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent, by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, to plaintifffs attorney, George M. McCune at Suite
2, Intrade North West, 1399 South 700 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84105 and four (4) true and correct copies to the
Public Service Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84145.
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ADDENDUM 1

Public Service Commission
Report and Order
Dated November 15, 1985

' C £k- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

MCCUNE & MCCUNE, a General
Partnership; GEORGE M. MCCUNE,
an Individual; JAMES P. MCCUNE,
an individual; and ARLENE C.
MCCUNE, an Individual,
Complainants

CASE NO. 85-049-03

vs.
MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE, an
Assumed Name of MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
a Public Service Telephone
Corporation, Respondent.

REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED:

November 15, 1985

Appearances:
George M. McCune
Floyd A. Jensen

For
w

Complainants
Respondent

By the Commission:
Pursuant to notice duly served, this matter came on
regularly for hearing the 11th day of October, 1985, before A.
Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge for the Commission, at
the Commission Offices, Fourth Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office
Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Evidence was

offered and received, and the Administrative Law Judge, having
been fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Order based thereon.
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- 2 FINDINGS OF FACT
1 , McCune & McCune was a general law partnership doing
business in the state of Utah from November 1973 through November
1983, at which time it was dissolved.
George M. and James P. McCune.

The sole partners were

At this juncture, as discussed

below, the complaints of all parties except George M. McCune are
moot, so far as this Commission is concerned, and hence we will
refer to George M. McCune as "Complainant".
2,

Mountain Bell Telephone, hereafter called "Respon-

dent" , is a utility holding a certificate of convenience and
necessity from this Commission operating a telephone system.
3*

Respondent provided telephone service to McCune and

McCune in Provo, Utah, under telephone number 373-0307, which
service was discontinued when the partnership dissolved, leaving
an unpaid balance of $317.29, the amount in dispute in this
proceeding.

The balance remained unpaid at the time of the

hearing.
4,

Approximately June, 1984, Respondent transferred

the partnership balance to the residence account of James P.
McCune.

Shortly thereafter, in July or August (the date is not

critical), Respondent disconnected James P. McCune's residential
service for failure to pay the partnership balance,. On or about
September 6, 1984, Respondent rescinded its action and restored
James P. McCune's residential service.
5*
ferred

the

On or about January 16, 1985, Respondent transpartnership's

outstanding

balance

to

the working
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- 3 business

account

Complainant.

(listed

as

a

sole

proprietorship)

of

In March, 1985, this balance was billed to the

proprietorship account.
6.

Complainant refused to pay the transferred balance

and this complaint proceeding ensued.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 54-7-20, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides that:
(1) When complaint has been made to the
commission concerning any rate, fare, toll,
rental or charge for any product or commodity
furnished or service performed by any public
utility, and the commission has found, after
investigation, that the public utility has
charged an amount for such product, commodity
or service in excess of the schedules, rates
and tariffs on file with the commission, or
has charged an unjust, unreasonable or
discriminatory amount against the complainant, the commission may order that the public
utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from the date of
collection.
Although the statute mentions only authority to grant relief by
way of reparations in cases of this nature, we think it reasonable to assume that we could order a utility to continue service
to a customer invalidly charged under an illegal tariff provision.
At the time Respondent first transferred the partnership balance to James P. McCune, the applicable tariff provision
read as follows:
In the event a customer is indebted to the
Company for charges and services previously
rendered in Utah, or for services under one
or more numbers at the same location, and the
customer does not pay the charges or satisfy
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and
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- 4 bill such indebtedness for a residence
account against the same customer's residence
service or a business account against the
customer's
business
service,
(Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General
Exchange Tariff A2.2.3.2(3))
It was in literal compliance with this provision that
the transfer to James P. McCune's residence account was rescinded.

As a further consequence, however, Respondent amended its

tariff to read as follows:
In the event a customer is indebted to the
Company for charges and services rendered at
a prior time, of any nature, or for service
at more than one number or location, and the
customer does not pay the charges or satisfy
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and
bill such indebtedness against the account of
the customer's present service or to the
account of either service in the case where
more than one number or location is being
served.
(Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph - Utah General Exchange Tariff
A2.2.3.2(3), amended March 4, 1985)
It will be noted that either tariff provision would
apply in regard to Complainant's situation.

Accordingly, we are

not faced with a question of interpreting the tariff.

Since

service has been restored to James P. and Arlene C. McCune, and
the tariff provision relied upon at that time has been superseded, we conclude the complaints of these individuals is wholly
moot.

Accordingly, we deal

transfer

of

the

partnership

only with
balance

to

the propriety
the

sole

of the

proprietor

account of Complainant.
Complainant stated his argument in several ways, but
the kernel of the argument is that the Respondent's tariff,
either version, is invalid as it applies to him, because it
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- 5 denies him his right to have the partnership assets marshalled
and exhausted before a partnership creditor may reach his personal

assets.

According

to

the Complainant, Respondents

only

remedy in cases of this nature is to obtain a judgment against
the partnership, attempt to execute on partnership property, and
only upon a showing of exhaustion of the same is Respondent
entitled to attempt collection from Complainant.
By analogy, were we to accept Complainant's position,
had the partnership ordered merchandise from an office supplier
and failed to payf the supplier would not be justified in denying
Complainant credit for failure to pay the outstanding balance.
Such is obviously not the law.

While Complainant may have the

right to have the assets marshalled in judicial proceedings, he
is at least secondarily liable on the partnership deht, and we
know of no authority which would deny a partnership creditor the
right to use such leverage as he may have by way of the right to
enter into or avoid further transactions with a partner as a
means of encouraging payment.
harsh.

The partner

has

Nor does this appear to us unduly

the right of contribution

from his

copartners.
Does Respondent's status as a public utility alter the
situation?

Complainant argues it does and relies on the case of

John C. Josephson v. Mountain Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
576 P.2d 850, 24 PUR 4th 65 (Utah 1978).

That case involved the

transfer of a business account balance to a residence account.
The applicable tariff at the time was virtually identical to the

CASE NO. 85-049-03
- 6 March 4, 1985, amended version quoted above. The Court's opinion
is somewhat ambiguous, but the Court did not in so many words
rule the tariff invalid and appears to have reasoned that Respondent did not fully comply with its own tariff in that it failed
to bill the delinquent account on the debtor1s residence service
before

terminating

the

same.

There

is

additional

language

concerning the interests of other members of the household in
maintaining
present

telephone

in the

Complainant.

service, but

instant case.

that

interest

is

Moreover, Respondent

hardly

did bill

Accordingly, we do not believe the Josephson case

is apposite here.
Complainant argues that Respondent could pursue its
judicial remedy at minimal expense in small claims court, and we
should compel it to do so.

This argument from a member of the

bar well acquainted with the means to force delays and increase
costs strikes us as less than ingenuous.

If we are compar-

ing equities, Complainant has nothing to lose but his time in a
claim against his partner in small claims court.
would clearly have out-of-pocket expense.

Respondent

The fact of the matter

is that bad debt expenses are included as operating expense in
every rate case.

This means that all ratepayers bear the costs

caused by those who abuse the system.
circumstances

such

as

this,

those

We see no reason why, in
ratepayers

should

not be

accorded the benefit of Respondent's leverage in the form of the
power to provide or withhold
unpaid over two years.

service.

The balance has gone

That strikes us as more than long enough.

CASE NO. 85-049-03
- 7 Finally,

Complainant

would

have

us

invalidate

tariff as overly broad on the basis of the Josephson case.

the
As

noted above, the Utah Supreme Court did not do so, and we are not
faced

in

this

Josephson.

case with

a

fact

situation

as

appealing

as

Accordingly, we decline to invalidate the tariff

provision at this point.

The complaint should be dismissed.
ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the complaint in the above-captioned matter be, and the same hereby is,
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED

at

Salt

Lake

City, Utah, this

15th

day

of

November, 1985.

A. Robert Thurman
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 15th day of November, 1985,
as the Report and Order of the Commission with the following
comments:

COMMISSION COMMENTS

We concur in this Order, however, we frankly find this
case infuriating.

For a member or members of the Utah State Bar

to use, or we might say, abuse the "system" over an uncontested
$317.29 two-year old debt, is absurd.
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- 8 The expense to the regulated utility

(billing, col-

lection, legal, etc.) and the expense to the state regulatory
agency

(Administrative

Law

Judge,

court

reporter, clerical,

Commission review, etc.), which is ultimately born by the ratepaying citizens of this state, could well exceed $5,000 T*
Chief Justice Burger has recently chastised the legal
profession for being too litigious.

No matter how valid the

complainant's feel their cause is, as a strictly legal matter, we
believe that it is unconscionable for members of the Bar to abuse
the system to this extent and would, were it possible, impose the
full cost upon complainants.

UsuUl
B r e n t H. Cahieron, Chairman

ap*^6 M. B y r n e , Comm^^ioner
Ja

Georgia/B. Peterson
Executive Secretary

ADDENDUM 2

Public Service Commission
Order Denying
Application for Rehearing
Dated December 20, 1985

°a
h

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH MCCUNE & MCCUNE, a General
Partnership; GEORGE M. MCCUNE,
an Individual; JAMES P. MCCUNE,
an Individual; and ARLENE C.
MCCUNE, an Individual,
Complainants

*

&
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vs.

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION
FOR REHEARING

MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE, an
Assumed Name of MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
a Public Service Telephone
Corporation, Respondent.

ISSUED:

December 20, 1985

By the Commission:
On November 15, 1985, the Commission issued its Report
and Order dismissing Complainants1 Complaint for want of merit
and Complainants thereafter filed an Application for Review or
Rehearing with the Commission on December 2, 1985.
After

review

of

the

Complainants'

Application

for

Review or Rehearing, we conclude that it sheds no additional
illumination on the case and that it constitutes primarily a
diatribe
Judges.

against

the

Commission

and

its

Administrative

Law

Accordingly, we shall dismiss it.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Applica-

tion for Review or Rehearing filed by Complainants in this matter
be and the same is dismissed.
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- 2 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of Decemb e r , 1985.

£ . ^

artjzTs M. Byrne, Commissioner

, Commissioner

Georgia
Executi

Peterson
Secretary

mm

